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RE: Subject coming soon :  Date:   Mon, 5 May 2003 17:37:59
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Of war and more    (PenSword)
This guy says he is a professional peace worker
 Trial Excerpts
... In refusing to register, I was affirming my belief in the responsibility of individual
citizens to prevent war, as stated in the Nuremberg Accords; rather than ...

     I Must Still Resist
     ... that not only was I justifed in refusing to register for the draft, but that in
     fact various international agreements, particularly the Nuremberg Accords, ...

      Atrocities Conference: Introductory Essay by Peter Maguire
... Should the Nuremberg trials be judged by their legacy? ... timely in light of the UN's
failure to enforce the war crimes provisions of the Dayton Accords in former ...

Why the Oslo Accords Should Be Abbrogated by Israel - A ...
... Related Nuremberg-category crimes, including crimes of war and crimes against humanity ...
 now being released from Israeli jails in furtherance of the Oslo accords ...

General Resources on Genocide and Mass Killings
... of Procedure and Evidence, Dayton Peace Accords ... documents linked to from the Nuremberg
War Crimes Trial ... the Franck Report, various petitions, excerpts ...

The Black Book of Communism. Excerpts from the introduction and ...
... Excerpts from The Black Book of Communism ... on the condemnation of Nazism at Nuremberg ... and
Pierre Vidal-Naquet on the trial of ... This accords with the definition of ...

History 369: THE WORLD SINCE 1914. Web Readings
... Somme; The Husain-McMahon Letters (excerpts ... to the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial ... for Freedom",
1961; South Africa's Nuremberg ... in the Western Sahara; Regional Accords ...

Internet Modern History Sourcebook: The Twentieth Century: War, ...
... Information Resources; WEB The Adolf Eichman Trial ... the Holocaust [At VWC]; The Nuremberg ..
. Cambodia
1978: Year Zero, 1978, excerpts ... At]; The Helsinki Accords ...

SANE Serbian-American Alliance of New England
... Violated Helsinki Accords Final Act of 1975 which ... (See translated excerpts from Junge
Welt ... lawyer, former prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial ...

[PDF]War Crimes and Vietnam: The "Nuremberg Defense" and the Military ...
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat
... the war is over a Nuremberg-type trial ... The Nuremberg Charter explicitly exempted
the tribunal from ... motion pictures, depositions, popular books and excerpts ...

 Is the Biochip the Mark of the Beast?
         They SayThe Devil IS IN the details             
   RNA on a Chip  By David Cameron March 30, 2001
New diagnostic technique promises to put a powerful lab on a dime-sized slice of silicon.
 Ever since biochips—such as DNA  microarrays—came on the scene in 1996, researchers
have raced to increase their diagnostic capability.
check out the free mag offer !
Brave new world or future shock?
 Brain implant ? > or?  or > or> .    

In my opinion the most interesting are the religious sites like
Is the biochip the Mark of the Beast?

 This one looks real informative some how .
they once did an artical discussing the chip but
it was in 1999 so this is how we git  told we need it .
 U.S., Russia labs develop biochip to attack tuberculosis
this company makes them>    

... most fundamental human rights guranteed under the United States ..
. Intelligence Manned Interface (IMI) biochip for use in humans, told the
"Monetary Economic ...

Chip lithography harnessed to grow living brain cells
 August 21, 2001 - Electronic Engineering Times   R. Colin Johnson In an attempt to decipher the
 communications codes used by mammalian brain cells, University of Illinois researchers are using
 chip lithography to microprint furrows that growing brain cells will follow when budding inputs
(dendrites) and outputs (axons)

I think this pair of Google search's does about exhaust the subject for now

The Con of the Millennia              

A New Way of Consuming Animals?
You may  need Adobe Acrobat to read this file
this is very  important now!

Anti CIA

COINTELPRO in the 60's * 70's* 80's & 90's from Brian Glick's War at Home
this was important then

one of the best on the topic  


Time for you track shoe's

  Hitler's Forgotten Victims  

Overlooked Millions:
Non-Jewish Victims of the Holocaust

        Once the Nazi regime took power, sterilization was often performed on these
          children in the name of the preservation of "racial purity." When the Rhineland  was
          remilitarized by the Nazis (its first violation of the Treaty of Versailles), the black
          population residing there was attacked directly and forcibly sterilized.

          As for African-American prisoners of war, they were segregated in POW camps and offered less in terms of provisions, food, etc. Of course, they were already segregated in the American armed forces, but their treatment worsened once taken prisoners.

 Ironically, Black units of the U.S. Armed Forces liberated several Concentration Camps in Germany.

Hitler's Forgotten Victims  

this page is dedicated to symbolic speech,
which is assured as a right by the constitution
 of the United States.

Also Check out the websites at


 Long-buried Vatican files reveal a new and shocking indictment of World
 War II's Pope Plus XII: that in pursuit of absolute power he helped Adolf
 Hitler destroy German Catholic political opposition, betrayed the Jews of
 Europe, and sealed a deeply cynical pact with a 20th-century devil.


 One evening several years ago when I was having dinner with a group of
 students, the topic of the papacy was broached, and the discussion quickly
 boiled over. A young woman asserted that Eugenio Pacelli, Pope Pius XII,
 the Pope during World War II, had brought lasting shame on thc Catholic
 Church by failing to denounce the Final Solution. A young man, a
 practicing Catholic, insisted that the case had never been proved.

 Raised as a Catholic during the papacy of Pius Xll - his picture gazed down
 from the wall of every classroom during my childhood - I was only too
 familiar with the allegation. It started in 1963 with a play by a young
 German author named Rolf Hochhuth, Der Stellvertreter (Thc Deputy)
 which was staged on Broadway in 1964.

 It depicted Pacelli as a ruthless cynic, interested more in the Vatican's
 stockholdings than in the fate of the Jews. Most Catholics dismissed
 Hochhuth's thesis as implausible, but the play sparked a controversy
 which has raged to this day.

 Disturbed by the anger brought out in that dinner altercation, and
 convinced, as I had always been, of Pius XII's innocence, I decided to write
 a new defense of his reputation for a younger generation. I believed that
 Pacelli's evident holiness was proof of his good faith. How could such a
 saintly pope have betrayed the Jews? But was it possible to find a new and
 conclusive approach to the issue? The arguments had so far focused
 mainly on his wartime conduct; however, Pacelli's Vatican career had
 started 40 years earlier. It seemed to me that a proper investigation into
 Pacelli's record would require a more extensive chronicle than any
 attempted in the past. So I applied for access to archival material in the
 Vatican, reassuring those who had charge of crucial documents that I was
 on the side of my subject. Six years earlier, in a book entitled A Thief in
 the Night, I had defended the Vatican against charges that Pope John Paul
 I had been murdered by his own aides.

 Two key officials granted me access to secret material: depositions under
 oath gathered 30 years ago to support the process for Pacelli's
 canonization, and the archive of the Vatican Secretariat of State, the
 foreign office of the Holy See. I also drew on German sources relating to
 Pacelli's activities in Germany during the 1920s and 1930s, including his
 dealings with AdoIf Hitler in 1933. For months on end I ransacked
 Pacelli's files, which dated back to 1912, in a windowless dungeon beneath
 the Borgia Tower in Vatican City. Later I sat for several weeks in a dusty
 office in the Jesuit headquarters, close to St. Peter's Square in Rome,
 mulling over a thousand pages of transcribed testimony given under oath
 by those who had known Pacelli well during his lifetime, including his

 By the middle of 1997, 1 was in a state of moral shock. The material I had
 gathered amounted not to an exoneration but to an indictment more
 scandalous than Hochhuth's. The evidence was explosive. It showed for the
 first time that PaceIli was patently, and by the proof of his own words,
 anti-Jewish. It revealed that he had helped Hitler to power and at the
 same time undermined potential Catholic resistance in Germany. It
 showed that he had implicitly denied and trivialized the Holocaust, despite
 having reliable knowledge of its true extent. And, worse, that he was a
 hypocrite, for after the war he had retrospectively taken undue credit for
 speaking out boldly against the Nazi persecution of the Jews.

 In the "Holy Year" of 1950, a year in which many millions of pilgrims
 flocked to Rome to catch a glimpse of Pacelli, he was at the zenith of his
 papacy. This was the Pius people now in their mid-50s and older remember
 from newsreels and newspaper photographs. He was 74 years old and still
 vigorous. Six feet tall, stick thin at 125 pounds, light on his feet, regular
 in habits, he had hardly altered physically from the day of his coronation
 11 years earlier. He had beautiful tapering hands, a plaintive voice, large
 dark eyes and an aura of holiness. It was his extreme pallor that first
 arrested those who met him. His skin "had surprisingly transparent
 effect," observed the writer Gerrado Pallenberg, "as if reflecting from the
 inside a cold, white flame." His charisma was stunning. "His presence
 radiated a benignity, calm and sanctity that I have certainly never before
 sensed in any human being." recorded the English writer James
 Lees-Milne. "I immediately fell head over heels in love with him. I was so
 affected I could scarcely speak without tears and was conscious that my
 legs were trembling."

 But there was another side to his character, little known to the faithful.
 Although he was a man of selfless, monklike habits of prayer and
 simplicity, he was a believer in the absolute leadership principle. More
 than any other Vatican official of the century, he had promoted the
 modern ideology of autocratic papal control, the highly centralized,
 dictatoria1 authority he himself assumed on March 2, 1939, and
 maintained until his death in October 1958. There was a time before the
 advent of modern communications when Catholic authority was widely
 distributed, in the collective decisions of the church's councils and in
 collegial power-sharing between the Pope and the bishops. The absolutism
 of the modern papacy is largely an invention of the late 19th century It
 developed rapidly in the first decades of this century in response to the
 perception of the centrifugal breakup of the church under an array of
 contemporary pressures: materialism, increasing sexual freedom,
 religious skepticism, and social and political liberties. From his young
 manhood on, Pacelli played a leading role in shaping the conditions and
 scope of modern papal power.

 Eugenio Pacelli was born in Rome in 1876, into a family of church lawyers
 who served the Vatican. He had an older sister and brother and a younger
 sister. His parents, devout Catholics, shared an apartment in central
 Rome with his grandfather, who had been a legal adviser to Pius IX, the
 longest-serving Pope in history. There was only one small brazier to supply
 heat for the whole family, even in the depths of winter. Eugenio was a
 modest youth, who never appeared before his siblings unless he was fully
 dressed in a jacket and tie. He would always come to the table with a book,
 which he would read after having asked the family's permission.

 From an early age he acted out the ritual of the Mass, dressed in robes
 supplied by his mother. He had a gift for languages and a prodigious
 memory. He was spindly and suffered from a "fastidious stomach." He
 retained a youthful piety all his life. Politically and legally, however, he
 was capable of great subtlety and cunning.

 The Pacelli's were fiercely loyal to the injured merit of the papacy. From
 1848, the Popes had progressively lost to the emerging nation-state of
 Italy their dominions, which had formed, since time immemorial, the
 midriff of the Italian peninsula. Six years before Eugenio's birth, the city
 of Rome itself had been seized, leaving the papacy in crisis. How could the
 Popes regard themselves as independent now that they were mere citizens
 of an upstart kingdom? Eugenio's grandfather and father believed
 passionately that the Popes could once again exert a powerful unifying
 authority over the church by the application of ecclesiastical and
 international law. In 1870, at a gathering in Rome of a preponderance of
 the world's bishops, known as the First Vatican Council, the Pope was
 dogmatically declared infallible in matters of faith and morals. He was also
 declared the unchallenged primate of the faithful. The Pope may have lost
 his temporal dominion, but spiritually he was solely in charge of his
 universal church.

 During the first two decades of this century, papal primacy and infallibility
 began to creep even beyond the ample boundaries set by the First Vatican
 Council. A powerful legal instrument transformed the 1870 primacy
 dogma into an unprecedented principle of papal power. Eugenio Pacelli, by
 then a brilliant young Vatican lawyer, had a major part in the drafting of
 that instrument, which was known as the Code of Canon Law.

 Pacelli had been recruited into the Vatican in 1901, at the age of 24, to
 specialize in international affairs and church law. Pious, slender, with dark
 luminous eyes, he was an instant favorite. He was invited to collaborate on
 the reformulation of church law with his immediate superior, Pietro
 Gaspam, a world-famous canon lawyer. Packaged in a single manual, the
 Code of Canon Law was distributed in 1917 to Catholic bishops and clergy
 throughout the world. According to this code, in the future all bishops
 would be nominated by the Pope; doctrinal error would be tantamount to
 heresy; priests would be subjected to strict censorship in their writings;
 papal letters to the faithful would be regarded as infallible (in practice if
 not in principle}: and an oath would be taken by all candidates for the
 priesthood to submit to the sense as well as the strict wording of doctrine
 as laid down by the Pope.

 But there was a problem. The church had historically granted the dioceses
 in the provincial states of Germany a large measure of local discretion and
 independence from Rome. Germany had one of the largest Catholic
 populations in the world, and its congregation was well educated and
 sophisticated, with hundreds of Catholic associations and newspapers and
 many Catholic universities and publishing houses. The historic autonomy
 of Germany's Catholic Church was enshrined in ancient church-state
 treaties known as concordats.

 Aged 41 and already an archbishop, PaceIli was dispatched to Munich as
 papal nuncio, or ambassador, to start the process of eliminating all
 existing legal challenges to the new papal autocracy. At the same time, he
 was to pursue a Reich Concordat, a treaty between the papacy and
 Germany as a whole which would supersede all local agreements and
 become a model of Catholic church-state relations. A Reich Concordat
 would mean formal recognition by the German government of the Pope's
 right to impose the new Code of Canon Law on Germany's Catholics. Such
 an arrangement was fraught with significance for a largely Protestant
 Germany. Nearly 400 years earlier, in Wittenberg, Martin Luther had
 publicly burned a copy of Canon Law in defiance of the centralized
 authority of the church. It was one of the defining moments of the
 Reformation, which was to divide Western Christendom into Catholics and

 In May 1917, Pacelli set off for Germany via Switzerland in a private
 railway compartment, with an additional wagon containing 60 cases of
 special foods for his delicate stomach. The Pope at that time, Benedict XV,
 was shocked at this extravagance, but PaceIli had favored status as the
 Vatican's best diplomat. Shortly after he settled in Munich, he acquired a
 reputation as a vigorous relief worker. He traveled through war-weary
 Germany extending charity to people of all religions and none. In an early
 letter to the Vatican, however he revealed himself to be less than
 enamored of Germany's Jews. On September 4, 1917. PaceIli informed
 Pietro Gaspam, who had become cardinal secretary of state in the Vatican
 -- the equivalent of foreign minister and prime minister -- that a Dr.
 Werner, the chief rabbi of Munich, had approached the nunciature
 begging a favor. In order to celebrate the festival of Tabernacles,
 beginning on October 1, the Jews needed palm fronds, which normally
 came from Italy. But the Italian government had forbidden the
 exportation, via Switzerland, of a stock of palms which the Jews had
 purchased and which were being held up in Como. "The Israelite
 Community," continued Pacelli, "are seeking the intervention of the Pope
 in the hope that he will plead on behalf of the thousands of German
 Jews." The favor in question was no more problematic than the
 transportation of Pacelli's 60 cases of food-stuffs had been a few months

 Pacelli informed Gaspam that he had warned the rabbi that "wartime
 delays in communication" would make things difficult. He also told
 Gaspam that he did not think it appropriate for the Vatican "to assist
 them in the exercise of their Jewish cult." His letter went by the slow
 route overland in the diplomatic bag. Gaspatti replied by telegram on
 September 18 that he entirely trusted Pacelli's "shrewdness," agreeing
 that it would not be appropriate to help Rabbi Werner. PaceIli wrote back
 on September 28, 1917, informing Gasparri that he had again seen the
 Rabbi, who "was perfectly convinced of the reasons I had given him and
 thanked me warmly for all that I had done on his behalf." Pacelli had
 done nothing except thwart the rabbi's request. The episode, small in
 itself, belies subsequent claims that Pacelli had a great love of the Jewish
 religion and was always motivated by its best interests.

 Eighteen months later he revealed his antipathy toward the Jews in a
 more blatantly anti-Semitic fashion when he found himself at the center
 of a local revolution as Bolshevik groups struggled to take advantage of
 the chaos in postwar Munich. Writing to Gasparri, Pacelli described the
 revolutionaries and their chief, Eugen Levien in their headquarters in the
 former royal palace. The letter has lain in the Vatican secret archive like
 a time bomb until now:

 "The scene that presented itself at the palace was indescribable. The
 confusion totally chaotic, the filth completely nauseating; soldiers and
 armed workers coming and going; the building, once the home of a king,
 resounding with screams, vile language, profanities. Absolute hell. An
 army of employees were dashing to and fro, giving out orders, waving bits
 of paper, and in the midst of all this, a gang of young women, of dubious
 appearance, Jews like all the rest of them, hanging around in all the
 offices with provocative demeanor and suggestive smiles. The boss of this
 female gang was Levien's mistress, a young Russian woman, a Jew and a
 divorcee, who was in charge. And it was to her that the nunciature was
 obliged to pay homage in order to proceed.

 This Levien is a young man, about 30 or 35, also Russian and a Jew. Pale,
 dirty, with vacant eyes, hoarse voice, vulgar, repulsive, with a face that is
 both intelligent and sly."

 This association of Jewishness with Bolshevism confirms that Pacelli, from
 his early 40s, nourished a suspicion of and contempt for the Jews for
 political reasons. But the repeated references to the Jewishness of these
 individuals, along with the catalogue of stereotypical epithets deploring
 their physical and moral repulsiveness, betray a scorn and revulsion
 consistent with anti-Semitism. Not long after this, Pacelli campaigned to
 have black French troops removed from the Rhineland, convinced that
 they were raping women and abusing children - even though an
 independent inquiry sponsored by the U.S. Congress, of which Pacelli was
 aware, proved this allegation false. Twenty-three years later, when the
 Allies were about to enter Rome, he asked the British envoy to the
 Vatican to request of the British Foreign Office that no Allied colored
 troops would be among the small number that might be garrisoned in
 Rome after the occupation.

 Pacelli spent 13 years in Germany attempting to rewrite the state
 Concordats one by one in favor of the power of the Holy See and routinely
 employing diplomatic blackmail. Germany was caught up in many
 territorial disputes following the redrawing of the map of Central Europe
 after thc First World War. Pacelli repeatedly traded promises of Vatican
 support for German control of disputed regions in return for obtaining
 terms advantageous to the Vatican in Concordats. The German
 government's official in charge of Vatican affairs at one point recorded
 the "ill feeling" prompted by Pacelli's "excessive demands." Both
 Catholics and Protestants in Germany resisted reaching an agreement
 with Pacelli on a Reich Concordat because the nuncio's concept of a
 church-state relationship was too authoritarian. In his negotiations,
 Pacelli was not concerned about the fate of non-Catholic religious
 communities or institutions, or about human rights. He was principally
 preoccupied with the interests of the Holy See. Nothing could have been
 better designed to deliver Pacelli into the hands of Hitler later, when the
 future dictator made his move in 1933.

 In June 1920, Pacelli became nuncio to all of Germany, with headquarters
 in Berlin as well as in Munich, and immediately acquired a glittering
 reputation in diplomatic circles. He was a favorite at dinner parties and
 receptions, and he was known to ride horses on the estate of a wealthy
 German family. His household was run by a pretty young nun from
 southern Germany named Sister Pasqualina Lehnert. Pacelli's sister
 Elisabetta, who battled with the nun for Pacelli's affections, described
 Pasqualina as "scaltrissima"-- extremely cunning. In Munich it had been
 rumored that he cast more than priestly eyes on this religious
 housekeeper. Pacelli insisted that a Vatican investigation into this
 "horrible calumny" be conducted at the highest level, and his reputation
 emerged unbesmirched.

 Meanwhile, he had formed a close relationship with an individual named
 Ludwig Kaas. Kaas was a representative of the solidly Catholic German
 Center Party, one of the largest and most powerful democratic parties in
 Germany. Though it was unusual for a full-time politician, he was also a
 Roman Catholic priest. Five years Pacelli's junior, dapper, bespectacled,
 and invariably carrying a smart walking stick, Kaas, known as "the
 prelate," became an intimate collaborator of Pacelli's on every aspect of
 Vatican diplomacy in Germany. With Pacelli's encouragement, Kaas
 eventually became the chairman of the Center Party, the first priest to do
 so in the party's 60-year history. Yet while Kaas was officially a
 representative of a major democratic party, he was increasingly devoted to
 Pacelli to the point of becoming his alter ego.

 Sister Pasqualina stated after Pacelli's death that Kaas, who "regularly
 accompanied Pacelli on holiday" was linked to him in "adoration, honest
 love and unconditional loyalty." There were stories of acute jealousy and
 high emotion when Kaas became conscious of a rival affection in Pacelli's
 secretary, the Jesuit Robert Leiber, who was also German.

 Kaas was a profound believer in the benefits of a Reich Concordat, seeing
 a parallel between papal absolutism and the FÜHRER- PRINZIP, the
 Fascist leadership principle. His views coincided perfectly with Pacelli's on
 church-state politics, and their aspirations for centralized papal power
 were identical. Kaas's adulation of PaceIli, whom he put before his party,
 became a crucial element in the betrayal of Catholic democratic politics in

 In 1929, Pacelli was recalled to Rome to take over the most important role
 under the Pope, Cardinal Secretary of State. Sister Pasqualina arrived
 uninvited and cunningly, according to Pacelli's sister, and along with two
 German nuns to assist her, took over the management of his Vatican
 residence. Almost immediately Kaas, although he was still head of the
 German Center Party, started to spend long periods--months at a time --in
 Pacelli's Vatican apartments Shortly before Pacelli's return to Rome, his
 brother, Francesco had successfully negotiated on behalf of Pius Xl, the
 current Pope, a concordat with Mussolini as part of an agreement known
 as the Lateran Treaty. The rancor between the Vatican and the state of
 Italy was officially at an end. A precondition of the negotiations had
 involved the destruction of the parliamentary Catholic Italian Popular
 Party. Pius XI disliked political Catholicism because he could not control
 it. Like his predecessors, he believed that Catholic party politics brought
 democracy into the church by the back door. The result of the demise of
 the Popular Party was the wholesale shift of Catholics into the Fascist
 Party and the collapse of democracy in Italy. Pius XI and his new
 secretary of state, Pacelli, were determined that no accommodation be
 reached with Communists anywhere in the world - this was the time of
 persecution of the church in Russia, Mexico, and later Spain -but
 totalitarian movements and regimes of the right were a different matter.

 Hitler, who had enjoyed his first great success in the elections of
 September 1930, was determined to seek a treaty with the Vatican similar
 to that struck by Mussolini, which would lead to the disbanding of the
 German Center Party. In his political testament, Mein Kampf, he had
 recollected that his fear of Catholicism went back to his vagabond days in
 Vienna. The fact that German Catholics, politically united by the Center
 Party, had defeated Bismarck's Kulturkampf- the "culture struggle"
 against the Catholic Church in the 1870s--constantly worried him. He was
 convinced that his movement could succeed only if political Catholicism
 and its democratic networks were eliminated.

 Hitler's fear of the Catholic Church was well grounded. Into the early
 1930s the German Center Party, the German Catholic bishops, and the
 Catholic media had been mainly solid in their rejection of National
 Socialism. They denied Nazis the sacraments and church burials, and
 Catholic journalists excoriated National Socialism daily in Germany's 400
 Catholic ewspapers. The hierarchy instructed priests to combat National
 Socialism at a local level whenever it attacked Christianity. The
 Munich-based weekly Der Gerade Weg The Straight Path) told its readers,
 "Adolf Hitler preaches the law of lies. You who have fallen victim to the
 deceptions of one obsessed with despotism, wake up!"

 The vehement front of the Catholic Church in Germany against Hitler,
 however, was not at one with the view from inside the Vatican--a view that
 was now being shaped and promoted by Eugenio Pacelli.

 In 1930 the influential Catholic politician Heinrich Briining, a First World
 War Veteran, became the leader of a brief new government coalition,
 dominated by the majority Socialists and the Center Party. The country
 was reeling from successive economic crises against the background of the
 world slump and reparations payments to the Allies. In August 1931,
 Briining visited Pacelli in the Vatican, and the two men quarreled.
 Brüning tells in his memoirs how Pacelli lectured him, the German
 chancellor, on how he should reach an understanding with the Nazis to
 "form a right-wing administration" in order to help achieve a Reich
 Concordat favorable to the Vatican. When Brüning advised him not to
 interfere in German politics, Pacelli threw a tantrum. Brüning parting
 shot that day was the ironic observation- chilling in hindsight-- that he
 trusted that "the Vatican would fare better at the hands of Hitler ... than
 with himself, a devout Catholic."

 Briining was right on one score. Hitler proved to be the only chancellor
 prepared to grant Pacelli the sort of authoritarian concordat he was
 seeking. But the price was to be catastrophic for Catholic Germany and
 for Germany as a whole.

 After Hitler came to power in January 1933, he made the concordat
 negotiations with Pacelli a priority. The negotiations proceeded over six
 months with constant shuttle diplomacy between the Vatican and Berlin.
 Hitler spent more time on this treaty than on any other item of foreign
 diplomacy during his dictatorship.

 The Reich Concordat granted Pacelli the right to impose the new Code of
 Canon Law on Catholics in Germany and promised a number of measures
 favorable to Catholic education, including new schools. In exchange,
 Pacelli collaborated in the withdrawal of Catholics from political and social
 activity. The negotiations were conducted in secret by Pacelli, Kaas, and
 Hitler's deputy chancellor, Franz von Papen, over the heads of German
 bishops and the faithful. The Catholic Church in Germany had no say in
 setting the conditions.

 In the end, Hitler insisted that his signature on the concordat would
 depend on the Center Party's voting for the Enabling Act, the legislation
 that was to give him dictatorial powers. It was Kaas, chairman of the party
 but completely in thrall to Pacelli, who bullied the delegates into
 acceptance. Next, Hitler insisted on the "voluntary" disbanding of the
 Center Party, the last truly parliamentary force in Germany. Again,
 Pacelli was the prime mover in this tragic Catholic surrender. The fact
 that the party voluntarily disbanded itself, rather than go down fighting,
 had a profound psychological effect, depriving Germany of the last
 democratic focus of potential noncompliance and resistance: In the
 political vacuum created by its surrender, Catholics in the millions joined
 the Nazi Party, believing that it had the support of the Pope. The German
 bishops capitulated to Pacelli's policy of centralization, and German
 Catholic democrats found themselves politically leaderless.

 After the Reich Concordat was signed, Pacelli declared it an unparalleled
 triumph for the Holy See. In an article in L 'Osservatore Romano, the
 Vatican-controlled newspaper, he announced that the treaty, indicated the
 total recognition and acceptance of the church's law by the German state.
 But Hitler was the true victor and the Jews were the concordat's first
 victims. On July 14, 1933, after the initialing of the treaty, the Cabinet
 minutes record Hitler as saying that the concordat had created an
 atmosphere of confidence that would be "especially significant in the
 struggle against international Jewry." He was claiming that the Catholic
 Church had publicly given its blessing, at home and abroad, to the policies
 of National Socialism, including its anti-Semitic stand. At the same time,
 under the terms of the concordat, Catholic criticism of acts deemed
 political by the Nazis, could now be regarded as "foreign interference."
 The great German Catholic Church, at the insistence of Rome, fell silent.
 In the future all complaints against the Nazis would be channeled through
 Pacelli. There were some notable exceptions, for example the sermons
 preached in 1933 by Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber, the Archbishop of
 Munich, in which he denounced the Nazis for their rejection of the Old
 Testament as a Jewish text.

 The concordat immediately drew the German church into complicity with
 the Nazis. Even as Pacelli was granted special advantages in the concordat
 for German Catholic education, Hitler was trampling on the educational
 rights of Jews throughout the country. At the same time, Catholic priests
 were being drawn into Nazi collaboration with the attestation bureaucracy,
 which established Jewish ancestry. Pacelli, despite the immense
 centralized power he now wielded through the Code of Canon Law, said
 and did nothing. The attestation machinery would lead inexorably to the
 selection of millions destined for the death camps.

 As Nazi anti-Semitism mounted in Germany during the 1930's, Pacelli
 failed to complain, even on behalf of Jews who had become Catholics,
 acknowledging that the matter was a matter of German internal policy.
 Eventually, in January 1937, three German cardinals and two influential
 bishops arrived at the Vatican to plead for a vigorous protest over Nazi
 persecution of the Catholic Church, which had been deprived of all forms
 of activity beyond church services. Pins XI at last decided to issue an
 encyclical, a letter addressed to all the faithful of the world. Written under
 Pacelli's direction, it was called Mit Brennender Sorge (With Deep Anxiety),
 and it was a forthright statement of the plight of the church in Germany.
 But there was no explicit condemnation of anti-Semitism, even in relation
 to Jews who had converted to Catholicism. Worse still, the subtext against
 Nazism (National Socialism and Hitler were not mentioned by name) was
 blunted by the publication five days later of an even more condemnatory
 encyclical by Pins XI against Communism.

 The encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge, though too little and too late,
 revealed that the Catholic Church all along had the power to shake the
 regime. A few days later, Hermann Göring, one of Hitler's closest aides
 and his commander of the Luffwaffe, delivered a two-hour harangue to a
 Nazi assembly against the Catholic clergy. However, Roman centralizing
 had paralyzed the German Catholic Church and its powerful web of
 associations. Unlike the courageous grass-roots activism that had
 combated Bismarck's persecutions in the 1870s, German Catholicism now
 looked obediently to Rome for guidance. Although Pacelli collaborated in
 the writing and the distribution of the encyclical, he quickly undermined
 its effects by reassuring the Reich's ambassador in Rome. "Pacelli
 received me with decided friendliness," the diplomat reported back to
 Berlin, "and emphatically assured me during the conversation that normal
 and friendly relations with us would be restored as soon as possible."

 In the summer of 1938, as Pius XI lay dying, he became belatedly anxious
 about anti-Semitism throughout Europe. He commissioned another
 encyclical, to be written exclusively on the Jewish question. The text,
 which never saw the light of day, has only recently been discovered. It was
 written by three Jesuit scholars, but Pacelli presumably had charge of the
 project. It was to be called Humani Generis Unitas (The Unity of the
 Human Race). For all its good intentions and its repudiation of violent
 anti-Semitism, the document is replete with the anti-Jewishness that
 Pacelli had displayed in his early period in Germany. The Jews, the text
 claims, were responsible for their own fate. God had chosen them to make
 way for Christ's redemption, but they denied and killed him. And now,
 "blinded by their dream of worldly gain and material success," they
 deserved the "worldly and spiritual ruin" that they had brought down
 upon themselves.

 The document warns that that to defend the Jews as "Christian principles
 and humanity" demand could involve the unacceptable risk of being
 ensnared by secular politics--not least an association with Bolshevism. The
 encyclical was delivered in the fall of 1938 to the Jesuits in Rome, who sat
 on it. To this day we do not know why it was not completed and handed to
 Pope Pius XI. For all its drawbacks, it was a clear protest against Nazi
 attacks on Jews and so might have done some good. But it appears likely
 that the Jesuits, and Pacelli, whose influence as secretary of state of the
 Vatican was paramount since the Pope was moribund, were reluctant to
 inflame the Nazis by its publication. Pacelli, when he became pope, would
 bury the document deep in the secret archives.

 On February 10, 1939, Pius XI died, at the age of 81. Pacelli, then 63, was
 elected Pope by the College of Cardinals in just three ballots, on March 2.
 He was crowned on March 12, on the eve of Hitler's march into Prague.
 Between his election and his coronation he held a crucial meeting with the
 German cardinals. Keen to affirm Hitler publicly, he showed them a letter
 of good wishes which began, "To the Illustrious Herr Adolf Hitler." Should
 he, he asked them, style the Führer "Most Illustrious"? He decided that
 that might be going too far. He told the cardinals that Pius XI had said
 that keeping a papal nuncio in Berlin "conflicts with our honor." But his
 predecessor, he said, had been mistaken. He was going to maintain normal
 diplomatic relations with Hitler. The following month, at Pacelli's express
 wish, Archbishop Cesare Orsenigo, the Berlin nuncio, hosted a gala
 reception in honor of Hitler's 50th birthday. A birthday greeting to the
 Führer from the bishops of Germany would become an annual tradition
 until the war's end.

 Pacelli's coronation was the most triumphant in a hundred years. His style
 of papacy, for all his personal humility, was unprecedentedly pompous. He
 always ate alone. Vatican bureaucrats were obliged to take phone calls
 from him on their knees. When he took his afternoon walk, the
 gardeners had to hide in the bushes. Senior officials were not allowed to
 ask him questions or present a point of view.

 As Europe plunged toward war Pacelli cast himself in the role of judge of
 judges. But he continued to seek to appease Hitler by attempting to
 persuade the Poles to make concessions over Germany's territorial claims.
 After Hitler's invasion of Poland, on September 1, 1939, he declined to
 condemn Germany, to the bafflement of the Allies. His first public
 statement, the encyclical known in the English-speaking world as Darkness
 over the Earth, was full of papal rhetoric and equivocations.

 Then something extraordinary occurred, revealing that whatever had
 motivated Pacelli in his equivocal approach to the Nazi onslaught in Poland
 did not betoken cowardice or a liking for Hitler. In November 1939, in
 deepest secrecy, Pacelli became intimately and dangerously involved In
 what was probably the most viable plot to depose Hitler during the war.

 The plot centered on a group of anti-Nazi generals, committed to returning
 Germany to democracy. The coup might spark a civil war, and they wanted
 assurances that the West would not take advantage of the ensuing chaos.
 Pius XII agreed to act as go-between for the plotters and the Allies. Had
 his complicity in the plot been discovered it might have proved disastrous
 for the Vatican and for many thousands of German clergy. As it happened,
 leaders in London dragged their feet, and the plotters eventually fell
 silent. The episode demonstrates that, while Pacelli seemed weak to some,
 pusillanimity and indecisiveness were hardly in his nature.

 Pacelli's first wartime act of reticence in failing to speak out against
 Fascist brutality occurred in the summer of 1941, following Hitler's
 invasion of Yugoslavia and the formation of the Catholic and Fascist state
 of Croatia. In a wave of appalling ethnic cleansing, the Croat Fascist
 separatists, known as the Ustashe, under the leadership of Ante Pavelic,
 the Croat Führer, embarked on a campaign of enforced conversions,
 deportations, and mass extermination targeting a population of 2.2 million
 Serb Orthodox Christians and a smaller number of Jews and Gypsies.

 According to the Italian writer Carlo Falconi, as early as April, in a typical
 act of atrocity, a band of Ustashe had rounded up 331 Serbs. The victims
 were forced to dig their own graves before being hacked to death with
 axes. The local priest was forced to recite the prayers for the dying while
 his son was chopped to pieces before his eyes. Then the priest was
 tortured. His hair and beard were torn off, his eves were gouged out.
 Finally he was skinned alive. The very next month Pacelli greeted Pavelic
 at the Vatican.

 Throughout the war, the Croat atrocities continued By the most recent
 scholarly reckoning. 487,000 Orthodox Serbs and 27,000 Gypsies were
 massacred; in addition, approximately 30,000 out of a population of 45,000
 Jews were killed. Despite a close relationship between the Ustashe regime
 and the Catholic bishops, and a constant flow of information about the
 massacres, Pacelli said and did nothing. In fact, he continued to extend
 warm wishes to the Ustashe leadership. The only feasible explanation for
 Pacelli's silence was his perception of Croatia as a Catholic bridgehead
 into the East. The Vatican and the local bishops approved of mass
 conversion in Croatia (even though it was the result of fear rather than
 conviction), because they believed that this could spell the beginning of a
 return {?} of the Orthodox Christians there to papal allegiance. Pacelli
 was not a man to condone mass murder, but he evidently chose to turn a
 blind eye on Ustashe atrocities rather than hinder a unique opportunity to
 extend the power of the papacy.

 {Note from This is a very generous interpretation. In
 fact the Catholic Church, controlled the Independent State of Croatia. At one
 point it was in fact directly run by Archbishop Stepinac who answered to Pius
 XII. Stepinac has, in turn, been beatified by the current pope, in a Croatian
 ceremony attended by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.}

 Pacelli came to learn of the Nazi plans to exterminate the Jews of Europe
 shortly after they were laid in January 1942. The deportations to the death
 camps had begun in December 1941 and would continue through 1944. All
 during 1942, Pacelli received reliable information on the details of the
 Final Solution, much of it supplied by the British, French, and American
 representatives resident in the Vatican. On March 17, 1942,
 representatives of Jewish organizations assembled in Switzerland sent a
 memorandum to Pacelli via the papal nuncio in Bern, cataloguing violent
 anti-Semitic measures in Germany and in its allied and conquered
 territories. Their plea focused attention on Slovakia, Croatia, Hungary,
 and unoccupied France, where, they believed, the Pope's intervention
 might yet be effective. Apart from an intervention in the case of Slovakia,
 where the president was Monsignor Josef Tiso, a Catholic priest, no papal
 initiatives resulted. During the same month, a stream of dispatches
 describing the fate of some 90,000 Jews reached the Vatican from various
 sources in Eastern Europe. The Jewish organizations' long memorandum
 would be excluded from the wartime documents published by the Vatican
 between 1965 and 1981.

 On June 16, 1942, Harold Tittmann, the U.S. representative to the
 Vatican, told Washington that Pacelli was diverting himself, ostrichlike,
 into purely religious concerns and that the moral authority won for the
 papacy by Pius XI was being eroded. At the end of that month, the London
 Daily Telegraph announced that more than a million Jews had been killed
 in Europe and that it was the aim of the Nazis "to wipe the race from the
 European continent." The article was re-printed in The New York Times.
 On July 21 there was a protest rally on behalf of Europe's Jews in New
 York's Madison Square Garden. In the following weeks the British,
 American, and Brazilian representatives to the Vatican tried to persuade
 Pacelli to speak out against the Nazi atrocities. But still he said nothing.
 In September 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt sent his personal
 representative, the former head of U.S. Steel, Myron Taylor, to plead with
 PaceIli to make a statement about the extermination of the Jews. Taylor
 traveled hazardously through enemy territory to reach the Vatican. Still
 Pacelli refused to speak. Pacelli's excuse was that he must rise above the
 belligerent parties. As late as December 18, Francis d'Arcy Osborne,
 Britain's envoy in the Vatican, handed Cardinal Domenico Tardini,
 Pacelli's deputy secretary of state, a dossier replete with information on
 the Jewish deportations and mass killings in hopes that the Pope would
 denounce the Nazi regime in a Christmas message.

 On December 24, 1942, having made draft after draft, Pacelli at last said
 something. In his Christmas Eve broadcast to the world on Vatican Radio,
 he said that men of goodwill owed a vow to bring society "back to its
 immovable center of gravity in divine law." He went on: "Humanity owes
 this vow to those hundreds of thousands who, without any fault of their
 own, sometimes only by reason of their nationality and race, are marked
 for death or gradual extinction."

 That was the strongest public denunciation of the Final Solution that
 Pacelli would make in the whole course of the war.

 It was not merely a paltry statement. The chasm between the enormity of
 the liquidation of the Jewish people and this form of evasive language was
 profoundly scandalous. He might have been referring to many categories
 of victims at the hands of various belligerents in the conflict. Clearly the
 choice of ambiguous wording was intended to placate those who urged him
 to protest, while avoiding offense to the Nazi regime. But these
 considerations are over-shadowed by the implicit denial and trivialization.
 He had scaled down the doomed millions to "hundreds of thousands"
 without uttering the word "Jews," while making the pointed qualification
 "sometimes only by reason of their nationality or race." Nowhere was the
 term "Nazi'' mentioned. Hitler himself could not have wished for a more
 convoluted and innocuous reaction from the Vicar of Christ to the
 greatest crime in history.

 But what was Pacelli's principal motivation for this trivialization and
 denial? The Allies' diplomats in the Vatican believed that he was
 remaining impartial in order to earn a crucial role in future peace
 negotiations. In this there was clearly a degree of truth. But a
 recapitulation of new evidence I have gathered shows that Pacelli saw the
 Jews as alien and undeserving of his respect and compassion. He felt no
 sense of moral outrage at their plight. The documents show that:

 1. He had nourished a striking antipathy toward the Jews as early as 1917
 in Germany, which contradicts later claims that his omissions were
 performed in good faith and that he "loved" the Jews and respected their

 2. From the end of the First World War to the lost encyclical of 1938,
 Pacelli betrayed a fear and contempt of Judaism based on his belief that
 the Jews were behind the Bolshevik plot to destroy Christendom.

 3. Pacelli acknowledged to representatives of the Third Reich that the
 regime's anti-Semitic policies were a matter of Germany's internal
 politics. The Reich Concordat between Hitler and the Vatican, as Hitler
 was quick to grasp, created an ideal climate for Jewish persecution.

 4. Pacelli failed to sanction protest by German Catholic bishops against
 anti-Semitism, and he did not attempt to intervene in the process by which
 Catholic clergy collaborated in racial certification to identify Jews.

 5. After Pius XI's Mit Brennender Sorge, denouncing the Nazi regime
 (although not by name), Pacelli attempted to mitigate the effect of the
 encyclical by giving private diplomatic reassurances to Berlin despite his
 awareness of widespread Nazi persecution of Jews.

 6. Pacelli was convinced that the Jews had brought misfortune on their
 own heads: intervention on their behalf could only draw the church into
 alliances with forces inimical to Catholicism. Pacelli's failure to utter a
 candid word on the Final Solution proclaimed to the world that the Vicar of
 Christ was not roused to pity or anger. From this point of view, he was the
 ideal Pope for Hitler's unspeakable plan. His denial and minimization of
 the Holocaust were all the more scandalous in that they were uttered from
 a seemingly impartial moral high ground.

 There was another, more immediate indication of Pacelli's moral
 dislocation. It occurred before the liberation of Rome, when he was the
 sole Italian authority in the city. On October 16, 1943, SS troops entered
 the Roman ghetto area and rounded up more than 1,000 Jews, imprisoning
 them in the very shadow of the Vatican.

 How did Pacelli acquit himself'?

 On the morning of the roundup, which had been prompted by AdoIf
 Eichmann, who was in charge of the organization of the Final Solution
 from his headquarters in Berlin, the German ambassador in Rome pleaded
 with the Vatican to issue a public protest. By this stage of the war,
 Mussolini had been deposed and rescued by AdoIf Hitler to run the puppet
 regime in the North of Italy. The German authorities in Rome, both
 diplomats and military commanders, fearing a backlash of the Italian
 populace, hoped that an immediate and vigorous papal denunciation might
 stop the SS in their tracks and prevent further arrests. Pacelli refused. In
 the end, the German diplomats drafted a letter of protest on the Pope's
 behalf and prevailed on a resident German bishop to sign it for Berlin's
 benefit. Meanwhile, the deportation of the imprisoned Jews went ahead on
 October 18.

 When U.S. chargé d 'affaires Harold Tittmann visited Pacelli that day, he
 found the pontiff anxious that the "Communist" Partisans would take
 advantage of a cycle of papal protest, followed by SS reprisals, followed by
 a civilian backlash. As a consequence, he was not inclined to lift a finger
 for the Jewish deportees, who were now traveling in cattle cars to the
 Austrian border bound for Auschwitz. Church officials reported on the
 desperate plight of the deportees as they passed slowly through city after
 city. Still Pacelli refused to intervene.

 In the Jesuit archives in Rome, I found a secret document sworn to under
 oath by Karl Wolff, the SS commander in Italy. The text reveals that
 Hitler had asked Wolff in the fall of 1943 to prepare a plan to evacuate the
 Pope and the Vatican treasures to Liechtenstein.

 After several weeks of investigation, Wolff concluded that an attempt to
 invade the Vatican and its properties, or to seize the Pope in response to a
 papal protest, would prompt a backlash throughout Italy that would
 seriously hinder the Nazi war effort. Hitler therefore dropped his plan to
 kidnap Pacelli, acknowledging what Pacelli appeared to ignore, that the
 strongest social and political force in Italy in late 1943 was the Catholic
 Church, and that its potential for thwarting the SS was immense.

 Pacelli was concerned that a protest by him would benefit only the
 Communists. His silence on the deportation of Rome's Jews, in other
 words, was not an act of cowardice or fear of the Germans. He wanted to
 maintain the Nazi-occupation status quo until such time as the city could
 be liberated by the Allies. But what of the deported Jews? Five days after
 the train had set off from the Tiburtina station in Rome, an estimated
 1,060 had been gassed at Auschwitz and Birkenau - 149 men and 47
 women were detained for slave labor, but only 15 survived the war, and
 only one of those was a woman, Settimia Spizzichino, who had served as a
 human guinea pig of Dr. Josef Mengele, the Nazi medical doctor who
 performed atrocious experiments on human victims. After the liberation,
 she was found alive in a heap of corpses.

 But there was a more profound failure than Pacelli's unwillingness to help
 the Jews of Rome rounded up on October 16. Pacelli's reticence was not
 just a diplomatic silence in response to the political pressures of the
 moment, not just a failure to be morally outraged. It was a stunning
 religious and ritualistic silence. To my knowledge, there is no record of a
 single public papal prayer, lit votive candle, psalm, lamentation, or Mass
 celebrated in solidarity with the Jews of Rome either during their terrible
 ordeal or after their deaths. This spiritual silence in the face of an atrocity
 committed at the heart of Christendom, in the shadow of the shrine of the
 first apostle, persists to this day and implicates all Catholics. This silence
 proclaims that Pacelli had no genuine spiritual sympathy even for the
 Jews of Rome, who were members of the community of his birth. And yet,
 on learning of the death of AdoIf Hitler, Archbishop Adolf Bertram of
 Berlin ordered all the priests of his archdiocese "to hold a solemn
 Requiem in memory of the Führer."

 There were nevertheless Jews who gave Pacelli the benefit of the doubt.
 On Thursday, November 29, 1945, Pacelli met some 80 representatives of
 Jewish refugees who expressed their thanks "for his generosity toward
 those persecuted during the Nazi-Fascist period." One must respect a
 tribute made by people who had suffered and survived, and we cannot
 belittle Pacelli's efforts on the level of charitable relief, notably his
 directive that enclosed religious houses in Rome should take in Jews
 hiding from the SS.

 By the same token, we must respect the voice of Settimia Spizzichino, the
 sole Roman Jewish woman survivor from the death camps. Speaking in a
 BBC interview in 1995 she said. "1 came back from Auschwitz on my own.
 . I lost my mother, two sisters and one brother. Pius XII could have
 warned us about what was going to happen. We might have escaped from
 Rome and joined the partisans. He played right into the Germans' hands.
 It all happened right under his nose. But he was an anti-Semitic pope, a
 pro-German pope. He didn't take a single risk. And when they say the
 Pope is like Jesus Christ, it is not true. He did not save a single child."

 We are obliged to accept these contrasting views of Pacelli are not
 mutually exclusive. It gives a Catholic no satisfaction to accuse a Pope of
 acquiescing in the plans of Hitler. But one of the saddest ironies of
 Pacelli's papacy centers on the implications of his own pastoral self-image.
 At the beginning of a promotional film he commissioned about himself
 during the war, called The Angelic Pastor, the camera frequently focuses
 on the statue of the Good Shepherd in the Vatican gardens. The parable of
 the good shepherd tells of the pastor who so loves each of his sheep that
 he will do all, risk all, go to any pains, to save one member of his flock
 that is lost or in danger. To his everlasting shame, and to the shame of the
 Catholic Church, Pacelli disdained to recognize the Jews of Rome as
 members of his Roman flock, even though they had dwelled in the Eternal
 City since before the birth of Christ. And yet there was still something
 worse. After the liberation of Rome, when every perception of restraint on
 his freedom was lifted, he claimed retrospective moral superiority for
 having spoken and acted on behalf of the Jews. Addressing a Palestinian
 group on August 3, 1946, he said, "We disapprove of all recourse to
 force...Just as we condemned on various occasions in the past the
 persecutions that a fanatical anti-Semitism inflicted on the Hebrew
 people." His grandiloquent self-exculpation a year after the war had ended
 showed him to be not only an ideal pope for the Nazis Final Solution but
 also a hypocrite.

 The postwar period of Pacelli's papacy, through the 1950s, saw the
 apotheosis of the ideology of papal power as he presided over a triumphant
 Catholic Church in open confrontation with Communism. But it could not
 hold. The internal structures and morale of the church in Pacelli's final
 years began to show signs of fragmentation and decay, leading to a
 yearning for reassessment and renewal. In old age he became increasingly
 narrow-minded, eccentric. and hypochondriacal. He experienced religious
 visions, suffered from chronic hiccups, and received monkey-brain-cell
 injections for longevity. He had no love for, or trust in those who had to
 follow him. He failed to replace his secretary of state when lie died and for
 years he declined to appoint a full complement of cardinals. He died at the
 age of 82 on October 9,1958. His corpse decomposed rapidly in the
 autumnal Roman heat. At his lying-in-state, a guard fainted from the
 stench. Later, his nose turned black and fell off. Some saw in this sudden
 corruption of his mortal remains, a symbol of the absolute corruption of
 his papacy.

 The Second Vatican Council was called by John XXIII who succeeded
 Pacelli, in 1958, precisely to reject Pacelli's monolith in preference for a
 collegial, decentralized, human, Christian community, the Holy Spirit, and
 love. The guiding metaphor of the church of the future was of a "pilgrim
 people of God." Expectations ran high, but there was no lack of contention
 and anxiety as old habits and disciplines died hard. There were signs from
 the very outset that papal and Vatican hegemony would not easily
 acquiesce, that the Old Guard would attempt a comeback. As we approach
 the end of this century, the hopeful energy of the Second Vatican Council,
 or Vatican II, as it came to be called, appears to many a spent force. The
 church of Pius XII is reasserting itself in confirmation of a pyramidal
 church model: faith in the primacy of the man in the white robe dictating
 in solitude from the pinnacle. In the twilight years of John Paul II's long
 reign, the Catholic Church gives a pervasive impression of dysfunction
 despite his historic influence on the collapse of Communist tyranny in
 Poland and the Vatican's enthusiasm for entering its third millennium
 with a cleansed conscience.

 As the theologian Professor Adrian Hastings comments, "The great tide
 powered by Vatican II has, at least institutionally, spent its force. The old
 landscape has once more emerged and Vatican II is now being read in
 Rome far more in the spirit of the First Vatican Council and within the
 context of Pius XII's model of Catholicism.'' A future titanic struggle
 between the progressives and the traditionalists is in prospect, with the
 potential for a cataclysmic schism, especially in North America, where a
 split has opened up between bishops compliant with Rome and academic
 Catholicism, which is increasingly independent and dissident. Pacelli,
 whose canonization process is now well advanced, has become the icon, 40
 years after his death, of those traditionalists who read and revise the
 provisions of the Second Vatican Council from the viewpoint of Pacelli's
 ideology of papal power--an ideology that has proved disastrous in the
 century's history.

 Copyright Vanity Fair, 1999
 Reprinted for educational and non-commerical purposes only
Don't Panic
Population - none.It is known that there are an infinite number of worlds,
 simply because there is an infinite amount of space for them to be in.
However, not everyone of them is inhabited. Therefore, there must be
 a finite number of inhabited worlds. Any finite number divided by infinity
is as near to nothing as makes no odds, so the average population of all
the planets in the Universe can be said to be zero. From this it follows
 that the population of the whole Universe is also zero, and that any people
you may meet from time to time are merely the products of a deranged

The Hitchhikers' Guide to the Galaxy


           Soon we will have an alphabetical tap index
         Dont hold your breath