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![]() ![]() RE: Subject coming soon : http://TheGiganticHeartlessMultinationalCorporation.com/ Date: Mon, 5 May 2003 17:37:59
![]() ![]() FUNWITHPARANOIA
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![]() They SayThe Devil IS IN the details
![]() RNA on a Chip By David Cameron March 30, 2001
New diagnostic technique promises to put a powerful lab on a dime-sized slice of silicon.
Ever since biochips—such as DNA microarrays—came on the scene in 1996, researchers
have raced to increase their diagnostic capability.
check out the free mag offer !
Brave new world or future shock?
more
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() In my opinion the most interesting are the religious sites like
Is the biochip the Mark of the Beast?
This one looks real informative some how .
they once did an artical discussing the chip but
it was in 1999 so this is how we git told we need it .
U.S., Russia labs develop biochip to attack tuberculosis
this company makes them>
... most fundamental human rights guranteed under the United States ..
. Intelligence Manned Interface (IMI) biochip for use in humans, told the
"Monetary Economic ...
Chip lithography harnessed to grow living brain cells
![]() August 21, 2001 - Electronic Engineering Times R. Colin Johnson In an attempt to decipher the
![]() communications codes used by mammalian brain cells, University of Illinois researchers are using
![]() chip lithography to microprint furrows that growing brain cells will follow when budding inputs
![]() (dendrites) and outputs (axons)
![]() ![]() I think this pair of Google search's does about exhaust the subject for now
![]() The Con of the Millennia
Xenotransplantation:
A New Way of Consuming Animals?
You may need Adobe Acrobat to read this file http://www.ivu.org/ape/talks/lyons/lyons.pdf
this is very important now!
![]() COINTELPRO in the 60's * 70's* 80's & 90's from Brian Glick's War at Home
this was important then
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&safe=off&q=FBI%27s+COintelPro+Activities+&btnG
=Google+Search
one of the best on the topic
plus
![]() Time for you track shoe's
![]() Overlooked Millions:
Non-Jewish Victims of the Holocaust
Once the Nazi regime took power, sterilization was often performed on these
children in the name of the preservation of "racial purity." When the Rhineland was
remilitarized by the Nazis (its first violation of the Treaty of Versailles), the black
population residing there was attacked directly and forcibly sterilized.
As for African-American prisoners of war, they were segregated in POW camps and offered less in terms of provisions, food, etc. Of course, they were already segregated in the American armed forces, but their treatment worsened once taken prisoners.
Ironically, Black units of the U.S. Armed Forces liberated several Concentration Camps in Germany.
Hitler's Forgotten Victims
![]() this page is dedicated to symbolic speech,
![]() which is assured as a right by the constitution
![]() of the United States.
![]() Not rated site http://w3.trib.com/FACT/1st.lev.censoringyahoo.html
![]() ![]() Also Check out the websites at
![]() HITLER'S POPE
Long-buried Vatican files reveal a new and shocking indictment of World
War II's Pope Plus XII: that in pursuit of absolute power he helped Adolf
Hitler destroy German Catholic political opposition, betrayed the Jews of
Europe, and sealed a deeply cynical pact with a 20th-century devil.
BY JOHN CORNWELL
One evening several years ago when I was having dinner with a group of
students, the topic of the papacy was broached, and the discussion quickly
boiled over. A young woman asserted that Eugenio Pacelli, Pope Pius XII,
the Pope during World War II, had brought lasting shame on thc Catholic
Church by failing to denounce the Final Solution. A young man, a
practicing Catholic, insisted that the case had never been proved.
Raised as a Catholic during the papacy of Pius Xll - his picture gazed down
from the wall of every classroom during my childhood - I was only too
familiar with the allegation. It started in 1963 with a play by a young
German author named Rolf Hochhuth, Der Stellvertreter (Thc Deputy)
which was staged on Broadway in 1964.
It depicted Pacelli as a ruthless cynic, interested more in the Vatican's
stockholdings than in the fate of the Jews. Most Catholics dismissed
Hochhuth's thesis as implausible, but the play sparked a controversy
which has raged to this day.
Disturbed by the anger brought out in that dinner altercation, and
convinced, as I had always been, of Pius XII's innocence, I decided to write
a new defense of his reputation for a younger generation. I believed that
Pacelli's evident holiness was proof of his good faith. How could such a
saintly pope have betrayed the Jews? But was it possible to find a new and
conclusive approach to the issue? The arguments had so far focused
mainly on his wartime conduct; however, Pacelli's Vatican career had
started 40 years earlier. It seemed to me that a proper investigation into
Pacelli's record would require a more extensive chronicle than any
attempted in the past. So I applied for access to archival material in the
Vatican, reassuring those who had charge of crucial documents that I was
on the side of my subject. Six years earlier, in a book entitled A Thief in
the Night, I had defended the Vatican against charges that Pope John Paul
I had been murdered by his own aides.
Two key officials granted me access to secret material: depositions under
oath gathered 30 years ago to support the process for Pacelli's
canonization, and the archive of the Vatican Secretariat of State, the
foreign office of the Holy See. I also drew on German sources relating to
Pacelli's activities in Germany during the 1920s and 1930s, including his
dealings with AdoIf Hitler in 1933. For months on end I ransacked
Pacelli's files, which dated back to 1912, in a windowless dungeon beneath
the Borgia Tower in Vatican City. Later I sat for several weeks in a dusty
office in the Jesuit headquarters, close to St. Peter's Square in Rome,
mulling over a thousand pages of transcribed testimony given under oath
by those who had known Pacelli well during his lifetime, including his
critics.
By the middle of 1997, 1 was in a state of moral shock. The material I had
gathered amounted not to an exoneration but to an indictment more
scandalous than Hochhuth's. The evidence was explosive. It showed for the
first time that PaceIli was patently, and by the proof of his own words,
anti-Jewish. It revealed that he had helped Hitler to power and at the
same time undermined potential Catholic resistance in Germany. It
showed that he had implicitly denied and trivialized the Holocaust, despite
having reliable knowledge of its true extent. And, worse, that he was a
hypocrite, for after the war he had retrospectively taken undue credit for
speaking out boldly against the Nazi persecution of the Jews.
In the "Holy Year" of 1950, a year in which many millions of pilgrims
flocked to Rome to catch a glimpse of Pacelli, he was at the zenith of his
papacy. This was the Pius people now in their mid-50s and older remember
from newsreels and newspaper photographs. He was 74 years old and still
vigorous. Six feet tall, stick thin at 125 pounds, light on his feet, regular
in habits, he had hardly altered physically from the day of his coronation
11 years earlier. He had beautiful tapering hands, a plaintive voice, large
dark eyes and an aura of holiness. It was his extreme pallor that first
arrested those who met him. His skin "had surprisingly transparent
effect," observed the writer Gerrado Pallenberg, "as if reflecting from the
inside a cold, white flame." His charisma was stunning. "His presence
radiated a benignity, calm and sanctity that I have certainly never before
sensed in any human being." recorded the English writer James
Lees-Milne. "I immediately fell head over heels in love with him. I was so
affected I could scarcely speak without tears and was conscious that my
legs were trembling."
But there was another side to his character, little known to the faithful.
Although he was a man of selfless, monklike habits of prayer and
simplicity, he was a believer in the absolute leadership principle. More
than any other Vatican official of the century, he had promoted the
modern ideology of autocratic papal control, the highly centralized,
dictatoria1 authority he himself assumed on March 2, 1939, and
maintained until his death in October 1958. There was a time before the
advent of modern communications when Catholic authority was widely
distributed, in the collective decisions of the church's councils and in
collegial power-sharing between the Pope and the bishops. The absolutism
of the modern papacy is largely an invention of the late 19th century It
developed rapidly in the first decades of this century in response to the
perception of the centrifugal breakup of the church under an array of
contemporary pressures: materialism, increasing sexual freedom,
religious skepticism, and social and political liberties. From his young
manhood on, Pacelli played a leading role in shaping the conditions and
scope of modern papal power.
Eugenio Pacelli was born in Rome in 1876, into a family of church lawyers
who served the Vatican. He had an older sister and brother and a younger
sister. His parents, devout Catholics, shared an apartment in central
Rome with his grandfather, who had been a legal adviser to Pius IX, the
longest-serving Pope in history. There was only one small brazier to supply
heat for the whole family, even in the depths of winter. Eugenio was a
modest youth, who never appeared before his siblings unless he was fully
dressed in a jacket and tie. He would always come to the table with a book,
which he would read after having asked the family's permission.
From an early age he acted out the ritual of the Mass, dressed in robes
supplied by his mother. He had a gift for languages and a prodigious
memory. He was spindly and suffered from a "fastidious stomach." He
retained a youthful piety all his life. Politically and legally, however, he
was capable of great subtlety and cunning.
The Pacelli's were fiercely loyal to the injured merit of the papacy. From
1848, the Popes had progressively lost to the emerging nation-state of
Italy their dominions, which had formed, since time immemorial, the
midriff of the Italian peninsula. Six years before Eugenio's birth, the city
of Rome itself had been seized, leaving the papacy in crisis. How could the
Popes regard themselves as independent now that they were mere citizens
of an upstart kingdom? Eugenio's grandfather and father believed
passionately that the Popes could once again exert a powerful unifying
authority over the church by the application of ecclesiastical and
international law. In 1870, at a gathering in Rome of a preponderance of
the world's bishops, known as the First Vatican Council, the Pope was
dogmatically declared infallible in matters of faith and morals. He was also
declared the unchallenged primate of the faithful. The Pope may have lost
his temporal dominion, but spiritually he was solely in charge of his
universal church.
During the first two decades of this century, papal primacy and infallibility
began to creep even beyond the ample boundaries set by the First Vatican
Council. A powerful legal instrument transformed the 1870 primacy
dogma into an unprecedented principle of papal power. Eugenio Pacelli, by
then a brilliant young Vatican lawyer, had a major part in the drafting of
that instrument, which was known as the Code of Canon Law.
Pacelli had been recruited into the Vatican in 1901, at the age of 24, to
specialize in international affairs and church law. Pious, slender, with dark
luminous eyes, he was an instant favorite. He was invited to collaborate on
the reformulation of church law with his immediate superior, Pietro
Gaspam, a world-famous canon lawyer. Packaged in a single manual, the
Code of Canon Law was distributed in 1917 to Catholic bishops and clergy
throughout the world. According to this code, in the future all bishops
would be nominated by the Pope; doctrinal error would be tantamount to
heresy; priests would be subjected to strict censorship in their writings;
papal letters to the faithful would be regarded as infallible (in practice if
not in principle}: and an oath would be taken by all candidates for the
priesthood to submit to the sense as well as the strict wording of doctrine
as laid down by the Pope.
But there was a problem. The church had historically granted the dioceses
in the provincial states of Germany a large measure of local discretion and
independence from Rome. Germany had one of the largest Catholic
populations in the world, and its congregation was well educated and
sophisticated, with hundreds of Catholic associations and newspapers and
many Catholic universities and publishing houses. The historic autonomy
of Germany's Catholic Church was enshrined in ancient church-state
treaties known as concordats.
Aged 41 and already an archbishop, PaceIli was dispatched to Munich as
papal nuncio, or ambassador, to start the process of eliminating all
existing legal challenges to the new papal autocracy. At the same time, he
was to pursue a Reich Concordat, a treaty between the papacy and
Germany as a whole which would supersede all local agreements and
become a model of Catholic church-state relations. A Reich Concordat
would mean formal recognition by the German government of the Pope's
right to impose the new Code of Canon Law on Germany's Catholics. Such
an arrangement was fraught with significance for a largely Protestant
Germany. Nearly 400 years earlier, in Wittenberg, Martin Luther had
publicly burned a copy of Canon Law in defiance of the centralized
authority of the church. It was one of the defining moments of the
Reformation, which was to divide Western Christendom into Catholics and
Protestants.
In May 1917, Pacelli set off for Germany via Switzerland in a private
railway compartment, with an additional wagon containing 60 cases of
special foods for his delicate stomach. The Pope at that time, Benedict XV,
was shocked at this extravagance, but PaceIli had favored status as the
Vatican's best diplomat. Shortly after he settled in Munich, he acquired a
reputation as a vigorous relief worker. He traveled through war-weary
Germany extending charity to people of all religions and none. In an early
letter to the Vatican, however he revealed himself to be less than
enamored of Germany's Jews. On September 4, 1917. PaceIli informed
Pietro Gaspam, who had become cardinal secretary of state in the Vatican
-- the equivalent of foreign minister and prime minister -- that a Dr.
Werner, the chief rabbi of Munich, had approached the nunciature
begging a favor. In order to celebrate the festival of Tabernacles,
beginning on October 1, the Jews needed palm fronds, which normally
came from Italy. But the Italian government had forbidden the
exportation, via Switzerland, of a stock of palms which the Jews had
purchased and which were being held up in Como. "The Israelite
Community," continued Pacelli, "are seeking the intervention of the Pope
in the hope that he will plead on behalf of the thousands of German
Jews." The favor in question was no more problematic than the
transportation of Pacelli's 60 cases of food-stuffs had been a few months
earlier.
Pacelli informed Gaspam that he had warned the rabbi that "wartime
delays in communication" would make things difficult. He also told
Gaspam that he did not think it appropriate for the Vatican "to assist
them in the exercise of their Jewish cult." His letter went by the slow
route overland in the diplomatic bag. Gaspatti replied by telegram on
September 18 that he entirely trusted Pacelli's "shrewdness," agreeing
that it would not be appropriate to help Rabbi Werner. PaceIli wrote back
on September 28, 1917, informing Gasparri that he had again seen the
Rabbi, who "was perfectly convinced of the reasons I had given him and
thanked me warmly for all that I had done on his behalf." Pacelli had
done nothing except thwart the rabbi's request. The episode, small in
itself, belies subsequent claims that Pacelli had a great love of the Jewish
religion and was always motivated by its best interests.
Eighteen months later he revealed his antipathy toward the Jews in a
more blatantly anti-Semitic fashion when he found himself at the center
of a local revolution as Bolshevik groups struggled to take advantage of
the chaos in postwar Munich. Writing to Gasparri, Pacelli described the
revolutionaries and their chief, Eugen Levien in their headquarters in the
former royal palace. The letter has lain in the Vatican secret archive like
a time bomb until now:
"The scene that presented itself at the palace was indescribable. The
confusion totally chaotic, the filth completely nauseating; soldiers and
armed workers coming and going; the building, once the home of a king,
resounding with screams, vile language, profanities. Absolute hell. An
army of employees were dashing to and fro, giving out orders, waving bits
of paper, and in the midst of all this, a gang of young women, of dubious
appearance, Jews like all the rest of them, hanging around in all the
offices with provocative demeanor and suggestive smiles. The boss of this
female gang was Levien's mistress, a young Russian woman, a Jew and a
divorcee, who was in charge. And it was to her that the nunciature was
obliged to pay homage in order to proceed.
This Levien is a young man, about 30 or 35, also Russian and a Jew. Pale,
dirty, with vacant eyes, hoarse voice, vulgar, repulsive, with a face that is
both intelligent and sly."
This association of Jewishness with Bolshevism confirms that Pacelli, from
his early 40s, nourished a suspicion of and contempt for the Jews for
political reasons. But the repeated references to the Jewishness of these
individuals, along with the catalogue of stereotypical epithets deploring
their physical and moral repulsiveness, betray a scorn and revulsion
consistent with anti-Semitism. Not long after this, Pacelli campaigned to
have black French troops removed from the Rhineland, convinced that
they were raping women and abusing children - even though an
independent inquiry sponsored by the U.S. Congress, of which Pacelli was
aware, proved this allegation false. Twenty-three years later, when the
Allies were about to enter Rome, he asked the British envoy to the
Vatican to request of the British Foreign Office that no Allied colored
troops would be among the small number that might be garrisoned in
Rome after the occupation.
Pacelli spent 13 years in Germany attempting to rewrite the state
Concordats one by one in favor of the power of the Holy See and routinely
employing diplomatic blackmail. Germany was caught up in many
territorial disputes following the redrawing of the map of Central Europe
after thc First World War. Pacelli repeatedly traded promises of Vatican
support for German control of disputed regions in return for obtaining
terms advantageous to the Vatican in Concordats. The German
government's official in charge of Vatican affairs at one point recorded
the "ill feeling" prompted by Pacelli's "excessive demands." Both
Catholics and Protestants in Germany resisted reaching an agreement
with Pacelli on a Reich Concordat because the nuncio's concept of a
church-state relationship was too authoritarian. In his negotiations,
Pacelli was not concerned about the fate of non-Catholic religious
communities or institutions, or about human rights. He was principally
preoccupied with the interests of the Holy See. Nothing could have been
better designed to deliver Pacelli into the hands of Hitler later, when the
future dictator made his move in 1933.
In June 1920, Pacelli became nuncio to all of Germany, with headquarters
in Berlin as well as in Munich, and immediately acquired a glittering
reputation in diplomatic circles. He was a favorite at dinner parties and
receptions, and he was known to ride horses on the estate of a wealthy
German family. His household was run by a pretty young nun from
southern Germany named Sister Pasqualina Lehnert. Pacelli's sister
Elisabetta, who battled with the nun for Pacelli's affections, described
Pasqualina as "scaltrissima"-- extremely cunning. In Munich it had been
rumored that he cast more than priestly eyes on this religious
housekeeper. Pacelli insisted that a Vatican investigation into this
"horrible calumny" be conducted at the highest level, and his reputation
emerged unbesmirched.
Meanwhile, he had formed a close relationship with an individual named
Ludwig Kaas. Kaas was a representative of the solidly Catholic German
Center Party, one of the largest and most powerful democratic parties in
Germany. Though it was unusual for a full-time politician, he was also a
Roman Catholic priest. Five years Pacelli's junior, dapper, bespectacled,
and invariably carrying a smart walking stick, Kaas, known as "the
prelate," became an intimate collaborator of Pacelli's on every aspect of
Vatican diplomacy in Germany. With Pacelli's encouragement, Kaas
eventually became the chairman of the Center Party, the first priest to do
so in the party's 60-year history. Yet while Kaas was officially a
representative of a major democratic party, he was increasingly devoted to
Pacelli to the point of becoming his alter ego.
Sister Pasqualina stated after Pacelli's death that Kaas, who "regularly
accompanied Pacelli on holiday" was linked to him in "adoration, honest
love and unconditional loyalty." There were stories of acute jealousy and
high emotion when Kaas became conscious of a rival affection in Pacelli's
secretary, the Jesuit Robert Leiber, who was also German.
Kaas was a profound believer in the benefits of a Reich Concordat, seeing
a parallel between papal absolutism and the FÜHRER- PRINZIP, the
Fascist leadership principle. His views coincided perfectly with Pacelli's on
church-state politics, and their aspirations for centralized papal power
were identical. Kaas's adulation of PaceIli, whom he put before his party,
became a crucial element in the betrayal of Catholic democratic politics in
Germany.
In 1929, Pacelli was recalled to Rome to take over the most important role
under the Pope, Cardinal Secretary of State. Sister Pasqualina arrived
uninvited and cunningly, according to Pacelli's sister, and along with two
German nuns to assist her, took over the management of his Vatican
residence. Almost immediately Kaas, although he was still head of the
German Center Party, started to spend long periods--months at a time --in
Pacelli's Vatican apartments Shortly before Pacelli's return to Rome, his
brother, Francesco had successfully negotiated on behalf of Pius Xl, the
current Pope, a concordat with Mussolini as part of an agreement known
as the Lateran Treaty. The rancor between the Vatican and the state of
Italy was officially at an end. A precondition of the negotiations had
involved the destruction of the parliamentary Catholic Italian Popular
Party. Pius XI disliked political Catholicism because he could not control
it. Like his predecessors, he believed that Catholic party politics brought
democracy into the church by the back door. The result of the demise of
the Popular Party was the wholesale shift of Catholics into the Fascist
Party and the collapse of democracy in Italy. Pius XI and his new
secretary of state, Pacelli, were determined that no accommodation be
reached with Communists anywhere in the world - this was the time of
persecution of the church in Russia, Mexico, and later Spain -but
totalitarian movements and regimes of the right were a different matter.
Hitler, who had enjoyed his first great success in the elections of
September 1930, was determined to seek a treaty with the Vatican similar
to that struck by Mussolini, which would lead to the disbanding of the
German Center Party. In his political testament, Mein Kampf, he had
recollected that his fear of Catholicism went back to his vagabond days in
Vienna. The fact that German Catholics, politically united by the Center
Party, had defeated Bismarck's Kulturkampf- the "culture struggle"
against the Catholic Church in the 1870s--constantly worried him. He was
convinced that his movement could succeed only if political Catholicism
and its democratic networks were eliminated.
Hitler's fear of the Catholic Church was well grounded. Into the early
1930s the German Center Party, the German Catholic bishops, and the
Catholic media had been mainly solid in their rejection of National
Socialism. They denied Nazis the sacraments and church burials, and
Catholic journalists excoriated National Socialism daily in Germany's 400
Catholic ewspapers. The hierarchy instructed priests to combat National
Socialism at a local level whenever it attacked Christianity. The
Munich-based weekly Der Gerade Weg The Straight Path) told its readers,
"Adolf Hitler preaches the law of lies. You who have fallen victim to the
deceptions of one obsessed with despotism, wake up!"
The vehement front of the Catholic Church in Germany against Hitler,
however, was not at one with the view from inside the Vatican--a view that
was now being shaped and promoted by Eugenio Pacelli.
In 1930 the influential Catholic politician Heinrich Briining, a First World
War Veteran, became the leader of a brief new government coalition,
dominated by the majority Socialists and the Center Party. The country
was reeling from successive economic crises against the background of the
world slump and reparations payments to the Allies. In August 1931,
Briining visited Pacelli in the Vatican, and the two men quarreled.
Brüning tells in his memoirs how Pacelli lectured him, the German
chancellor, on how he should reach an understanding with the Nazis to
"form a right-wing administration" in order to help achieve a Reich
Concordat favorable to the Vatican. When Brüning advised him not to
interfere in German politics, Pacelli threw a tantrum. Brüning parting
shot that day was the ironic observation- chilling in hindsight-- that he
trusted that "the Vatican would fare better at the hands of Hitler ... than
with himself, a devout Catholic."
Briining was right on one score. Hitler proved to be the only chancellor
prepared to grant Pacelli the sort of authoritarian concordat he was
seeking. But the price was to be catastrophic for Catholic Germany and
for Germany as a whole.
After Hitler came to power in January 1933, he made the concordat
negotiations with Pacelli a priority. The negotiations proceeded over six
months with constant shuttle diplomacy between the Vatican and Berlin.
Hitler spent more time on this treaty than on any other item of foreign
diplomacy during his dictatorship.
The Reich Concordat granted Pacelli the right to impose the new Code of
Canon Law on Catholics in Germany and promised a number of measures
favorable to Catholic education, including new schools. In exchange,
Pacelli collaborated in the withdrawal of Catholics from political and social
activity. The negotiations were conducted in secret by Pacelli, Kaas, and
Hitler's deputy chancellor, Franz von Papen, over the heads of German
bishops and the faithful. The Catholic Church in Germany had no say in
setting the conditions.
In the end, Hitler insisted that his signature on the concordat would
depend on the Center Party's voting for the Enabling Act, the legislation
that was to give him dictatorial powers. It was Kaas, chairman of the party
but completely in thrall to Pacelli, who bullied the delegates into
acceptance. Next, Hitler insisted on the "voluntary" disbanding of the
Center Party, the last truly parliamentary force in Germany. Again,
Pacelli was the prime mover in this tragic Catholic surrender. The fact
that the party voluntarily disbanded itself, rather than go down fighting,
had a profound psychological effect, depriving Germany of the last
democratic focus of potential noncompliance and resistance: In the
political vacuum created by its surrender, Catholics in the millions joined
the Nazi Party, believing that it had the support of the Pope. The German
bishops capitulated to Pacelli's policy of centralization, and German
Catholic democrats found themselves politically leaderless.
After the Reich Concordat was signed, Pacelli declared it an unparalleled
triumph for the Holy See. In an article in L 'Osservatore Romano, the
Vatican-controlled newspaper, he announced that the treaty, indicated the
total recognition and acceptance of the church's law by the German state.
But Hitler was the true victor and the Jews were the concordat's first
victims. On July 14, 1933, after the initialing of the treaty, the Cabinet
minutes record Hitler as saying that the concordat had created an
atmosphere of confidence that would be "especially significant in the
struggle against international Jewry." He was claiming that the Catholic
Church had publicly given its blessing, at home and abroad, to the policies
of National Socialism, including its anti-Semitic stand. At the same time,
under the terms of the concordat, Catholic criticism of acts deemed
political by the Nazis, could now be regarded as "foreign interference."
The great German Catholic Church, at the insistence of Rome, fell silent.
In the future all complaints against the Nazis would be channeled through
Pacelli. There were some notable exceptions, for example the sermons
preached in 1933 by Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber, the Archbishop of
Munich, in which he denounced the Nazis for their rejection of the Old
Testament as a Jewish text.
The concordat immediately drew the German church into complicity with
the Nazis. Even as Pacelli was granted special advantages in the concordat
for German Catholic education, Hitler was trampling on the educational
rights of Jews throughout the country. At the same time, Catholic priests
were being drawn into Nazi collaboration with the attestation bureaucracy,
which established Jewish ancestry. Pacelli, despite the immense
centralized power he now wielded through the Code of Canon Law, said
and did nothing. The attestation machinery would lead inexorably to the
selection of millions destined for the death camps.
As Nazi anti-Semitism mounted in Germany during the 1930's, Pacelli
failed to complain, even on behalf of Jews who had become Catholics,
acknowledging that the matter was a matter of German internal policy.
Eventually, in January 1937, three German cardinals and two influential
bishops arrived at the Vatican to plead for a vigorous protest over Nazi
persecution of the Catholic Church, which had been deprived of all forms
of activity beyond church services. Pins XI at last decided to issue an
encyclical, a letter addressed to all the faithful of the world. Written under
Pacelli's direction, it was called Mit Brennender Sorge (With Deep Anxiety),
and it was a forthright statement of the plight of the church in Germany.
But there was no explicit condemnation of anti-Semitism, even in relation
to Jews who had converted to Catholicism. Worse still, the subtext against
Nazism (National Socialism and Hitler were not mentioned by name) was
blunted by the publication five days later of an even more condemnatory
encyclical by Pins XI against Communism.
The encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge, though too little and too late,
revealed that the Catholic Church all along had the power to shake the
regime. A few days later, Hermann Göring, one of Hitler's closest aides
and his commander of the Luffwaffe, delivered a two-hour harangue to a
Nazi assembly against the Catholic clergy. However, Roman centralizing
had paralyzed the German Catholic Church and its powerful web of
associations. Unlike the courageous grass-roots activism that had
combated Bismarck's persecutions in the 1870s, German Catholicism now
looked obediently to Rome for guidance. Although Pacelli collaborated in
the writing and the distribution of the encyclical, he quickly undermined
its effects by reassuring the Reich's ambassador in Rome. "Pacelli
received me with decided friendliness," the diplomat reported back to
Berlin, "and emphatically assured me during the conversation that normal
and friendly relations with us would be restored as soon as possible."
In the summer of 1938, as Pius XI lay dying, he became belatedly anxious
about anti-Semitism throughout Europe. He commissioned another
encyclical, to be written exclusively on the Jewish question. The text,
which never saw the light of day, has only recently been discovered. It was
written by three Jesuit scholars, but Pacelli presumably had charge of the
project. It was to be called Humani Generis Unitas (The Unity of the
Human Race). For all its good intentions and its repudiation of violent
anti-Semitism, the document is replete with the anti-Jewishness that
Pacelli had displayed in his early period in Germany. The Jews, the text
claims, were responsible for their own fate. God had chosen them to make
way for Christ's redemption, but they denied and killed him. And now,
"blinded by their dream of worldly gain and material success," they
deserved the "worldly and spiritual ruin" that they had brought down
upon themselves.
The document warns that that to defend the Jews as "Christian principles
and humanity" demand could involve the unacceptable risk of being
ensnared by secular politics--not least an association with Bolshevism. The
encyclical was delivered in the fall of 1938 to the Jesuits in Rome, who sat
on it. To this day we do not know why it was not completed and handed to
Pope Pius XI. For all its drawbacks, it was a clear protest against Nazi
attacks on Jews and so might have done some good. But it appears likely
that the Jesuits, and Pacelli, whose influence as secretary of state of the
Vatican was paramount since the Pope was moribund, were reluctant to
inflame the Nazis by its publication. Pacelli, when he became pope, would
bury the document deep in the secret archives.
On February 10, 1939, Pius XI died, at the age of 81. Pacelli, then 63, was
elected Pope by the College of Cardinals in just three ballots, on March 2.
He was crowned on March 12, on the eve of Hitler's march into Prague.
Between his election and his coronation he held a crucial meeting with the
German cardinals. Keen to affirm Hitler publicly, he showed them a letter
of good wishes which began, "To the Illustrious Herr Adolf Hitler." Should
he, he asked them, style the Führer "Most Illustrious"? He decided that
that might be going too far. He told the cardinals that Pius XI had said
that keeping a papal nuncio in Berlin "conflicts with our honor." But his
predecessor, he said, had been mistaken. He was going to maintain normal
diplomatic relations with Hitler. The following month, at Pacelli's express
wish, Archbishop Cesare Orsenigo, the Berlin nuncio, hosted a gala
reception in honor of Hitler's 50th birthday. A birthday greeting to the
Führer from the bishops of Germany would become an annual tradition
until the war's end.
Pacelli's coronation was the most triumphant in a hundred years. His style
of papacy, for all his personal humility, was unprecedentedly pompous. He
always ate alone. Vatican bureaucrats were obliged to take phone calls
from him on their knees. When he took his afternoon walk, the
gardeners had to hide in the bushes. Senior officials were not allowed to
ask him questions or present a point of view.
As Europe plunged toward war Pacelli cast himself in the role of judge of
judges. But he continued to seek to appease Hitler by attempting to
persuade the Poles to make concessions over Germany's territorial claims.
After Hitler's invasion of Poland, on September 1, 1939, he declined to
condemn Germany, to the bafflement of the Allies. His first public
statement, the encyclical known in the English-speaking world as Darkness
over the Earth, was full of papal rhetoric and equivocations.
Then something extraordinary occurred, revealing that whatever had
motivated Pacelli in his equivocal approach to the Nazi onslaught in Poland
did not betoken cowardice or a liking for Hitler. In November 1939, in
deepest secrecy, Pacelli became intimately and dangerously involved In
what was probably the most viable plot to depose Hitler during the war.
The plot centered on a group of anti-Nazi generals, committed to returning
Germany to democracy. The coup might spark a civil war, and they wanted
assurances that the West would not take advantage of the ensuing chaos.
Pius XII agreed to act as go-between for the plotters and the Allies. Had
his complicity in the plot been discovered it might have proved disastrous
for the Vatican and for many thousands of German clergy. As it happened,
leaders in London dragged their feet, and the plotters eventually fell
silent. The episode demonstrates that, while Pacelli seemed weak to some,
pusillanimity and indecisiveness were hardly in his nature.
Pacelli's first wartime act of reticence in failing to speak out against
Fascist brutality occurred in the summer of 1941, following Hitler's
invasion of Yugoslavia and the formation of the Catholic and Fascist state
of Croatia. In a wave of appalling ethnic cleansing, the Croat Fascist
separatists, known as the Ustashe, under the leadership of Ante Pavelic,
the Croat Führer, embarked on a campaign of enforced conversions,
deportations, and mass extermination targeting a population of 2.2 million
Serb Orthodox Christians and a smaller number of Jews and Gypsies.
According to the Italian writer Carlo Falconi, as early as April, in a typical
act of atrocity, a band of Ustashe had rounded up 331 Serbs. The victims
were forced to dig their own graves before being hacked to death with
axes. The local priest was forced to recite the prayers for the dying while
his son was chopped to pieces before his eyes. Then the priest was
tortured. His hair and beard were torn off, his eves were gouged out.
Finally he was skinned alive. The very next month Pacelli greeted Pavelic
at the Vatican.
Throughout the war, the Croat atrocities continued By the most recent
scholarly reckoning. 487,000 Orthodox Serbs and 27,000 Gypsies were
massacred; in addition, approximately 30,000 out of a population of 45,000
Jews were killed. Despite a close relationship between the Ustashe regime
and the Catholic bishops, and a constant flow of information about the
massacres, Pacelli said and did nothing. In fact, he continued to extend
warm wishes to the Ustashe leadership. The only feasible explanation for
Pacelli's silence was his perception of Croatia as a Catholic bridgehead
into the East. The Vatican and the local bishops approved of mass
conversion in Croatia (even though it was the result of fear rather than
conviction), because they believed that this could spell the beginning of a
return {?} of the Orthodox Christians there to papal allegiance. Pacelli
was not a man to condone mass murder, but he evidently chose to turn a
blind eye on Ustashe atrocities rather than hinder a unique opportunity to
extend the power of the papacy.
{Note from emperors-clothes.com: This is a very generous interpretation. In
fact the Catholic Church, controlled the Independent State of Croatia. At one
point it was in fact directly run by Archbishop Stepinac who answered to Pius
XII. Stepinac has, in turn, been beatified by the current pope, in a Croatian
ceremony attended by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.}
Pacelli came to learn of the Nazi plans to exterminate the Jews of Europe
shortly after they were laid in January 1942. The deportations to the death
camps had begun in December 1941 and would continue through 1944. All
during 1942, Pacelli received reliable information on the details of the
Final Solution, much of it supplied by the British, French, and American
representatives resident in the Vatican. On March 17, 1942,
representatives of Jewish organizations assembled in Switzerland sent a
memorandum to Pacelli via the papal nuncio in Bern, cataloguing violent
anti-Semitic measures in Germany and in its allied and conquered
territories. Their plea focused attention on Slovakia, Croatia, Hungary,
and unoccupied France, where, they believed, the Pope's intervention
might yet be effective. Apart from an intervention in the case of Slovakia,
where the president was Monsignor Josef Tiso, a Catholic priest, no papal
initiatives resulted. During the same month, a stream of dispatches
describing the fate of some 90,000 Jews reached the Vatican from various
sources in Eastern Europe. The Jewish organizations' long memorandum
would be excluded from the wartime documents published by the Vatican
between 1965 and 1981.
On June 16, 1942, Harold Tittmann, the U.S. representative to the
Vatican, told Washington that Pacelli was diverting himself, ostrichlike,
into purely religious concerns and that the moral authority won for the
papacy by Pius XI was being eroded. At the end of that month, the London
Daily Telegraph announced that more than a million Jews had been killed
in Europe and that it was the aim of the Nazis "to wipe the race from the
European continent." The article was re-printed in The New York Times.
On July 21 there was a protest rally on behalf of Europe's Jews in New
York's Madison Square Garden. In the following weeks the British,
American, and Brazilian representatives to the Vatican tried to persuade
Pacelli to speak out against the Nazi atrocities. But still he said nothing.
In September 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt sent his personal
representative, the former head of U.S. Steel, Myron Taylor, to plead with
PaceIli to make a statement about the extermination of the Jews. Taylor
traveled hazardously through enemy territory to reach the Vatican. Still
Pacelli refused to speak. Pacelli's excuse was that he must rise above the
belligerent parties. As late as December 18, Francis d'Arcy Osborne,
Britain's envoy in the Vatican, handed Cardinal Domenico Tardini,
Pacelli's deputy secretary of state, a dossier replete with information on
the Jewish deportations and mass killings in hopes that the Pope would
denounce the Nazi regime in a Christmas message.
On December 24, 1942, having made draft after draft, Pacelli at last said
something. In his Christmas Eve broadcast to the world on Vatican Radio,
he said that men of goodwill owed a vow to bring society "back to its
immovable center of gravity in divine law." He went on: "Humanity owes
this vow to those hundreds of thousands who, without any fault of their
own, sometimes only by reason of their nationality and race, are marked
for death or gradual extinction."
That was the strongest public denunciation of the Final Solution that
Pacelli would make in the whole course of the war.
It was not merely a paltry statement. The chasm between the enormity of
the liquidation of the Jewish people and this form of evasive language was
profoundly scandalous. He might have been referring to many categories
of victims at the hands of various belligerents in the conflict. Clearly the
choice of ambiguous wording was intended to placate those who urged him
to protest, while avoiding offense to the Nazi regime. But these
considerations are over-shadowed by the implicit denial and trivialization.
He had scaled down the doomed millions to "hundreds of thousands"
without uttering the word "Jews," while making the pointed qualification
"sometimes only by reason of their nationality or race." Nowhere was the
term "Nazi'' mentioned. Hitler himself could not have wished for a more
convoluted and innocuous reaction from the Vicar of Christ to the
greatest crime in history.
But what was Pacelli's principal motivation for this trivialization and
denial? The Allies' diplomats in the Vatican believed that he was
remaining impartial in order to earn a crucial role in future peace
negotiations. In this there was clearly a degree of truth. But a
recapitulation of new evidence I have gathered shows that Pacelli saw the
Jews as alien and undeserving of his respect and compassion. He felt no
sense of moral outrage at their plight. The documents show that:
1. He had nourished a striking antipathy toward the Jews as early as 1917
in Germany, which contradicts later claims that his omissions were
performed in good faith and that he "loved" the Jews and respected their
religion.
2. From the end of the First World War to the lost encyclical of 1938,
Pacelli betrayed a fear and contempt of Judaism based on his belief that
the Jews were behind the Bolshevik plot to destroy Christendom.
3. Pacelli acknowledged to representatives of the Third Reich that the
regime's anti-Semitic policies were a matter of Germany's internal
politics. The Reich Concordat between Hitler and the Vatican, as Hitler
was quick to grasp, created an ideal climate for Jewish persecution.
4. Pacelli failed to sanction protest by German Catholic bishops against
anti-Semitism, and he did not attempt to intervene in the process by which
Catholic clergy collaborated in racial certification to identify Jews.
5. After Pius XI's Mit Brennender Sorge, denouncing the Nazi regime
(although not by name), Pacelli attempted to mitigate the effect of the
encyclical by giving private diplomatic reassurances to Berlin despite his
awareness of widespread Nazi persecution of Jews.
6. Pacelli was convinced that the Jews had brought misfortune on their
own heads: intervention on their behalf could only draw the church into
alliances with forces inimical to Catholicism. Pacelli's failure to utter a
candid word on the Final Solution proclaimed to the world that the Vicar of
Christ was not roused to pity or anger. From this point of view, he was the
ideal Pope for Hitler's unspeakable plan. His denial and minimization of
the Holocaust were all the more scandalous in that they were uttered from
a seemingly impartial moral high ground.
There was another, more immediate indication of Pacelli's moral
dislocation. It occurred before the liberation of Rome, when he was the
sole Italian authority in the city. On October 16, 1943, SS troops entered
the Roman ghetto area and rounded up more than 1,000 Jews, imprisoning
them in the very shadow of the Vatican.
How did Pacelli acquit himself'?
On the morning of the roundup, which had been prompted by AdoIf
Eichmann, who was in charge of the organization of the Final Solution
from his headquarters in Berlin, the German ambassador in Rome pleaded
with the Vatican to issue a public protest. By this stage of the war,
Mussolini had been deposed and rescued by AdoIf Hitler to run the puppet
regime in the North of Italy. The German authorities in Rome, both
diplomats and military commanders, fearing a backlash of the Italian
populace, hoped that an immediate and vigorous papal denunciation might
stop the SS in their tracks and prevent further arrests. Pacelli refused. In
the end, the German diplomats drafted a letter of protest on the Pope's
behalf and prevailed on a resident German bishop to sign it for Berlin's
benefit. Meanwhile, the deportation of the imprisoned Jews went ahead on
October 18.
When U.S. chargé d 'affaires Harold Tittmann visited Pacelli that day, he
found the pontiff anxious that the "Communist" Partisans would take
advantage of a cycle of papal protest, followed by SS reprisals, followed by
a civilian backlash. As a consequence, he was not inclined to lift a finger
for the Jewish deportees, who were now traveling in cattle cars to the
Austrian border bound for Auschwitz. Church officials reported on the
desperate plight of the deportees as they passed slowly through city after
city. Still Pacelli refused to intervene.
In the Jesuit archives in Rome, I found a secret document sworn to under
oath by Karl Wolff, the SS commander in Italy. The text reveals that
Hitler had asked Wolff in the fall of 1943 to prepare a plan to evacuate the
Pope and the Vatican treasures to Liechtenstein.
After several weeks of investigation, Wolff concluded that an attempt to
invade the Vatican and its properties, or to seize the Pope in response to a
papal protest, would prompt a backlash throughout Italy that would
seriously hinder the Nazi war effort. Hitler therefore dropped his plan to
kidnap Pacelli, acknowledging what Pacelli appeared to ignore, that the
strongest social and political force in Italy in late 1943 was the Catholic
Church, and that its potential for thwarting the SS was immense.
Pacelli was concerned that a protest by him would benefit only the
Communists. His silence on the deportation of Rome's Jews, in other
words, was not an act of cowardice or fear of the Germans. He wanted to
maintain the Nazi-occupation status quo until such time as the city could
be liberated by the Allies. But what of the deported Jews? Five days after
the train had set off from the Tiburtina station in Rome, an estimated
1,060 had been gassed at Auschwitz and Birkenau - 149 men and 47
women were detained for slave labor, but only 15 survived the war, and
only one of those was a woman, Settimia Spizzichino, who had served as a
human guinea pig of Dr. Josef Mengele, the Nazi medical doctor who
performed atrocious experiments on human victims. After the liberation,
she was found alive in a heap of corpses.
But there was a more profound failure than Pacelli's unwillingness to help
the Jews of Rome rounded up on October 16. Pacelli's reticence was not
just a diplomatic silence in response to the political pressures of the
moment, not just a failure to be morally outraged. It was a stunning
religious and ritualistic silence. To my knowledge, there is no record of a
single public papal prayer, lit votive candle, psalm, lamentation, or Mass
celebrated in solidarity with the Jews of Rome either during their terrible
ordeal or after their deaths. This spiritual silence in the face of an atrocity
committed at the heart of Christendom, in the shadow of the shrine of the
first apostle, persists to this day and implicates all Catholics. This silence
proclaims that Pacelli had no genuine spiritual sympathy even for the
Jews of Rome, who were members of the community of his birth. And yet,
on learning of the death of AdoIf Hitler, Archbishop Adolf Bertram of
Berlin ordered all the priests of his archdiocese "to hold a solemn
Requiem in memory of the Führer."
There were nevertheless Jews who gave Pacelli the benefit of the doubt.
On Thursday, November 29, 1945, Pacelli met some 80 representatives of
Jewish refugees who expressed their thanks "for his generosity toward
those persecuted during the Nazi-Fascist period." One must respect a
tribute made by people who had suffered and survived, and we cannot
belittle Pacelli's efforts on the level of charitable relief, notably his
directive that enclosed religious houses in Rome should take in Jews
hiding from the SS.
By the same token, we must respect the voice of Settimia Spizzichino, the
sole Roman Jewish woman survivor from the death camps. Speaking in a
BBC interview in 1995 she said. "1 came back from Auschwitz on my own.
. I lost my mother, two sisters and one brother. Pius XII could have
warned us about what was going to happen. We might have escaped from
Rome and joined the partisans. He played right into the Germans' hands.
It all happened right under his nose. But he was an anti-Semitic pope, a
pro-German pope. He didn't take a single risk. And when they say the
Pope is like Jesus Christ, it is not true. He did not save a single child."
We are obliged to accept these contrasting views of Pacelli are not
mutually exclusive. It gives a Catholic no satisfaction to accuse a Pope of
acquiescing in the plans of Hitler. But one of the saddest ironies of
Pacelli's papacy centers on the implications of his own pastoral self-image.
At the beginning of a promotional film he commissioned about himself
during the war, called The Angelic Pastor, the camera frequently focuses
on the statue of the Good Shepherd in the Vatican gardens. The parable of
the good shepherd tells of the pastor who so loves each of his sheep that
he will do all, risk all, go to any pains, to save one member of his flock
that is lost or in danger. To his everlasting shame, and to the shame of the
Catholic Church, Pacelli disdained to recognize the Jews of Rome as
members of his Roman flock, even though they had dwelled in the Eternal
City since before the birth of Christ. And yet there was still something
worse. After the liberation of Rome, when every perception of restraint on
his freedom was lifted, he claimed retrospective moral superiority for
having spoken and acted on behalf of the Jews. Addressing a Palestinian
group on August 3, 1946, he said, "We disapprove of all recourse to
force...Just as we condemned on various occasions in the past the
persecutions that a fanatical anti-Semitism inflicted on the Hebrew
people." His grandiloquent self-exculpation a year after the war had ended
showed him to be not only an ideal pope for the Nazis Final Solution but
also a hypocrite.
The postwar period of Pacelli's papacy, through the 1950s, saw the
apotheosis of the ideology of papal power as he presided over a triumphant
Catholic Church in open confrontation with Communism. But it could not
hold. The internal structures and morale of the church in Pacelli's final
years began to show signs of fragmentation and decay, leading to a
yearning for reassessment and renewal. In old age he became increasingly
narrow-minded, eccentric. and hypochondriacal. He experienced religious
visions, suffered from chronic hiccups, and received monkey-brain-cell
injections for longevity. He had no love for, or trust in those who had to
follow him. He failed to replace his secretary of state when lie died and for
years he declined to appoint a full complement of cardinals. He died at the
age of 82 on October 9,1958. His corpse decomposed rapidly in the
autumnal Roman heat. At his lying-in-state, a guard fainted from the
stench. Later, his nose turned black and fell off. Some saw in this sudden
corruption of his mortal remains, a symbol of the absolute corruption of
his papacy.
The Second Vatican Council was called by John XXIII who succeeded
Pacelli, in 1958, precisely to reject Pacelli's monolith in preference for a
collegial, decentralized, human, Christian community, the Holy Spirit, and
love. The guiding metaphor of the church of the future was of a "pilgrim
people of God." Expectations ran high, but there was no lack of contention
and anxiety as old habits and disciplines died hard. There were signs from
the very outset that papal and Vatican hegemony would not easily
acquiesce, that the Old Guard would attempt a comeback. As we approach
the end of this century, the hopeful energy of the Second Vatican Council,
or Vatican II, as it came to be called, appears to many a spent force. The
church of Pius XII is reasserting itself in confirmation of a pyramidal
church model: faith in the primacy of the man in the white robe dictating
in solitude from the pinnacle. In the twilight years of John Paul II's long
reign, the Catholic Church gives a pervasive impression of dysfunction
despite his historic influence on the collapse of Communist tyranny in
Poland and the Vatican's enthusiasm for entering its third millennium
with a cleansed conscience.
As the theologian Professor Adrian Hastings comments, "The great tide
powered by Vatican II has, at least institutionally, spent its force. The old
landscape has once more emerged and Vatican II is now being read in
Rome far more in the spirit of the First Vatican Council and within the
context of Pius XII's model of Catholicism.'' A future titanic struggle
between the progressives and the traditionalists is in prospect, with the
potential for a cataclysmic schism, especially in North America, where a
split has opened up between bishops compliant with Rome and academic
Catholicism, which is increasingly independent and dissident. Pacelli,
whose canonization process is now well advanced, has become the icon, 40
years after his death, of those traditionalists who read and revise the
provisions of the Second Vatican Council from the viewpoint of Pacelli's
ideology of papal power--an ideology that has proved disastrous in the
century's history.
Copyright Vanity Fair, 1999
Reprinted for educational and non-commerical purposes only
![]() ![]() ![]() Don't Panic
Population
Population - none.It is known that there are an infinite number of worlds,
simply because there is an infinite amount of space for them to be in.
However, not everyone of them is inhabited. Therefore, there must be
a finite number of inhabited worlds. Any finite number divided by infinity
is as near to nothing as makes no odds, so the average population of all
the planets in the Universe can be said to be zero. From this it follows
that the population of the whole Universe is also zero, and that any people
you may meet from time to time are merely the products of a deranged
imagination.
The Hitchhikers' Guide to the Galaxy
![]() ![]() Soon we will have an alphabetical tap index
![]() Dont hold your breath
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